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INCE mid-2007, financial markets have been in turmoil. Soaring
delinquencies on U.S. subprime mortgages were the primary trigger
of recent events. However, that initial shock both uncovered and
exacerbated other weaknesses in the global financial system. Because fi-
nancial markets are interconnected, both across asset classes and coun-
tries, the impact has been widespread. Global capital markets must
function smoothly and effectively for economies to achieve sustainable
growth. It is therefore in the interests of both policy makers and market
participants to identify the causes of the market turmoil and to take the
steps necessary to mitigate systemic risk, restore investor confidence, and
facilitate stable economic growth.
The President's Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG) has un-
dertaken a thorough analysis of the underlying factors contributing to the
recent and on-going market stress. This analysis has been conducted to
identify the weaknesses in global markets, institutions, and regulatory
policies that triggered, amplified, or failed to mitigate the stress. On the
basis of this analysis, the PWG has developed a comprehensive set of
recommendations to address those weaknesses. This statement summa-
rizes that analysis and sets out recommendations. It is comprised of three
sections: a diagnosis and summary of recommendations; a review of fac-
tors contributing to the market turmoil; and a fuller discussion of policy
issues and recommendations.
L Diagnosis and Summary of Recommendations
Diagnosis
The global market turmoil has not yet abated, so any diagnosis is neces-
sarily incomplete. Nonetheless, it seems clear from experience to date
that the principal underlying causes of the turmoil in financial markets
were:
" a breakdown in underwriting standards for subprime mortgages;
* a significant erosion of market discipline by those involved in the
securitization process, including originators, underwriters, credit
rating agencies, and global investors, related in part to failures to
provide or obtain adequate risk disclosures;
* flaws in credit rating agencies' assessments of subprime residen-
tial mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and other complex
structured credit products, especially collateralized debt obliga-
tions (CDOs) that held RMBS and other asset-backed securities
(CDOs of ABS);
* risk management weaknesses at some large U.S. and European
financial institutions; and
* regulatory policies, including capital and disclosure' require-
ments, that failed to mitigate risk management weaknesses.
1. In this document disclosure requirements refer to the requirements of prudential
regulators of financial institutions rather than to the Securities and Exchange
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The turmoil in financial markets clearly was triggered by a dramatic
weakening of underwriting standards for U.S. subprime mortgages, begin-
ning in late 2004 and extending into early 2007. But the loosening of
credit standards and terms in the subprime market was symptomatic of a
much broader erosion of market discipline on the standards and terms of
loans to households and businesses. Following many years of benign eco-
nomic conditions and plentiful market liquidity, global investors had be-
come quite complacent about risks, even in the case of new and
increasingly complex financial instruments.
Competition and the desire to maintain higher returns created signifi-
cant demand for structured credit products by investors. Originators, un-
derwriters, asset managers, credit rating agencies, and investors failed to
obtain sufficient information or to conduct comprehensive risk assess-
ments on instruments that often were quite complex. Investors relied ex-
cessively on credit ratings, which contributed to their complacency about
the risks they were assuming in pursuit of higher returns. Although mar-
ket participants had economic incentives to conduct due diligence and eval-
uate risk-adjusted returns, the steps they took were insufficient, resulting in
a significant erosion of market discipline.
Faulty assumptions underlying rating methodologies and the subsequent
re-evaluations by the credit rating agencies (CRAs) led to a significant
number of downgrades of subprime RMBS, even of recently issued secur-
ities. Downgrades were even more frequent and severe for CDOs of
ABS with subprime mortgage loans as the underlying collateral. The
number and severity of negative ratings actions caused investors to lose
confidence in the accuracy of the ratings of a wide range of structured
credit products. This loss of investor confidence caused many structured
finance markets to seize up and caused markets for asset-backed com-
mercial paper (ABCP), some of which was backed by RMBS and CDOs
of ABS, to contract substantially.
These developments revealed serious weaknesses in risk management
practices at several large U.S. and European financial institutions, espe-
cially with respect to the concentration of risks, the valuation of illiquid
instruments, the pricing of contingent liquidity facilities, and the manage-
ment of liquidity risk. Common themes were the failure of stress testing
procedures to identify institutions' vulnerabilities to system-wide shocks
to markets and market participants, and difficulties aggregating expo-
sures across business lines and valuing instruments when markets became
illiquid. These weaknesses were particularly evident with respect to the
management of risks of holding CDOs of ABS, sponsoring or supporting
off-balance sheet conduits that issued ABCP, and syndicating leveraged
loans. As a result, some institutions suffered significant losses and many
experienced significant balance sheet pressures. Balance sheet pressures
contributed to a tightening of firms' lending standards and terms for a
Commission's (SEC) disclosure regulations and requirements applicable to U.S.
public companies.
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wide range of borrowers, which in turn has contributed to the slowing of
U.S. economic growth.
In some cases, regulatory policies failed to mitigate those risk manage-
ment weaknesses. For example, existing capital requirements encouraged
the securitization of assets through facilities with very low capital require-
ments and failed to provide adequate incentives for firms to maintain
capital and liquidity buffers sufficient to absorb extreme system-wide
shocks without taking actions that tended to amplify shocks. Further, su-
pervisory authorities did not insist on appropriate disclosures of firms'
potential exposure to off-balance sheet vehicles.
Summary of Recommendations
The PWG has carefully reviewed the weaknesses in markets, institu-
tions, and regulatory and supervisory practices that have contributed to
financial turmoil and has developed recommendations to address those
weaknesses. In developing its recommendations, the PWG has sought to
avoid exacerbating the current strains on markets and institutions or risk-
ing unintended consequences. As noted above, the market turmoil has
not yet abated. Thus, the PWG or its member agencies may put forward
additional recommendations as events unfold and new insights are
gained. Although no single measure can be expected to place financial
markets on a sound footing, the PWG believes that implementation of its
comprehensive and complementary set of recommendations would con-
stitute an effective response to the identified weaknesses. In general, the
recommendations include measures to be implemented by government
authorities or market participants that will:
* reform key parts of the mortgage origination process in the
United States;
* enhance disclosure and improve the practices of sponsors, under-
writers, and investors with respect to securitized credits, thereby
imposing more effective market discipline;
* reform the credit rating agencies' processes for and practices re-
garding rating structured credit products to ensure integrity and
transparency;
* ensure that global financial institutions take appropriate steps to
address the weaknesses in risk management and reporting prac-
tices that the market turmoil has exposed; and
* ensure that prudential regulatory policies applicable to banks and
securities firms, including capital and disclosure requirements,
provide strong incentives for effective risk management practices.
Recommendations for reforming key parts of the mortgage origination
process include:
* All states should implement strong nationwide licensing stan-
dards for mortgage brokers;
* Federal and state regulators should strengthen and make consis-
tent government oversight of entities that originate and fund
mortgages and otherwise interface with customers in the mort-
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gage origination process. All states should work towards adopt-
ing the principles set forth in the guidance developed by the
federal regulators for nontraditional and subprime mortgage
lending and ensure that effective enforcement mechanisms are in
place to deal with noncompliance with such standards; and
The Federal Reserve should issue stronger consumer protection
rules and mandate enhanced consumer protection disclosures, in-
cluding disclosures that would make affordability over the life of
the mortgage more transparent and that would facilitate compari-
son of the terms with those of alternative products. State and
federal authorities should coordinate to enforce the rules evenly
across all types of mortgage originators.
Recommendations for improving investors' contributions to market disci-
pline include:
* Overseers of institutional investors (for example, the Department
of Labor for private pension funds; state treasurers for public
pension funds; and the SEC for money market funds) should re-
quire investors (and their asset managers) to obtain from spon-
sors and underwriters of securitized credits access to better
information about the risk characteristics of such credits, includ-
ing information about the underlying asset pools, on an initial
and ongoing basis;
" Overseers should ensure that these investors (and their asset
managers) develop an independent view of the risk characteris-
tics of the instruments in their portfolios, rather than rely solely
on credit ratings; and
* The PWG will engage the private sector to create a committee to
develop best practices regarding disclosure to investors in securi-
tized credits, including ABS and CDOs of ABS.
Recommendations for reforming the ratings processes for and practices
regarding structured credit and other securitized credit products include:
* Credit rating agencies should disclose what qualitative reviews
they perform on originators of assets that collateralize ABS rated
by the CRA and should require underwriters of ABS to re-
present the level and scope of due diligence performed on the
underlying assets;
" The CRAs should reform their ratings processes for structured
credit products to ensure integrity and transparency. The PWG
welcomes the steps already taken by the CRAs, and particularly
encourages the CRAs to:
o enforce policies and procedures that manage conflicts of inter-
est, including implementing changes suggested by the SEC's
broad review of conflict of interest issues;
o publish sufficient information about the assumptions underly-
ing their credit rating methodologies, so that users of credit
ratings can understand how a particular credit rating was
determined;
2008]
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" make changes to the credit rating process that would clearly
differentiate ratings for structured products from ratings for
corporate and municipal securities;
o make ratings performance measures for structured credit
products and other ABS readily available to the public in a
manner that facilitates comparisons across products and credit
ratings;
" work with investors to provide the information investors need
to make informed decisions about risk, including measures of
the uncertainty associated with ratings and of potential ratings
volatility; and
0 ensure that adequate personnel and financial resources are al-
located to monitoring and updating ratings.
* The PWG will facilitate formation of a private-sector group (with
representatives of investors, issuers, underwriters, and CRAs) to
develop recommendations for further steps that the issuers, un-
derwriters, CRAs, and policymakers could take to ensure the in-
tegrity and transparency of ratings, and to foster appropriate use
of ratings in risk assessment;
* PWG member agencies will reinforce steps taken by the CRAs
through revisions to supervisory policy and regulation, including
regulatory capital requirements that use ratings; and
* The PWG will revisit the need for changes to CRA oversight if
the reforms adopted by the CRAs are not sufficient to ensure the
integrity and transparency of ratings.
Recommendations to strengthen global financial institutions' risk manage-
ment practices include:
" Global financial institutions should promptly identify and address
any weaknesses in risk management practices that the turmoil has
revealed;
* The PWG will support formation of a private-sector group to re-
assess implementation of the Counterparty Risk Management
Policy Group II's (CRMPG II) existing guiding principles and
recommendations regarding risk management, risk monitoring,
and transparency, and to modify or develop new principles and
recommendations as necessary to incorporate lessons from the
recent turmoil, including lessons regarding valuation practices;
* Supervisors of global financial institutions should closely monitor
the firms' efforts to address risk management weaknesses, taking
action if necessary to ensure that weaknesses are addressed;
" U.S. banking regulators and the SEC should promptly assess cur-
rent guidance and develop common guidance to address the risk
management weaknesses revealed by the recent market turmoil,
including improvements to:
o management information systems, including procedures that
ensure aggregation of exposures across all business lines and
ensure rigorous valuations of instruments and exposures;
o concentration risk management, liquidity risk management,
stress testing and other risk management practices that are
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necessary to ensure that liquidity and capital cushions are suf-
ficiently robust to absorb extreme system-wide shocks; and
0 governance of the risk management and control framework,
including the development of, and adherence to, practices that
address incentive problems in compensation policies.
U.S. authorities should encourage other supervisors of global
firms to make complementary efforts to develop guidance along
the same lines.
Recommendations to enhance prudential regulatory policies include:
* Regulators should adopt policies that provide incentives for fi-
nancial institutions to hold capital and liquidity cushions com-
mensurate with firm-wide exposure (both on and off-balance
sheet) to severe adverse market events. These cushions should
be forward looking and adjust appropriately through peaks and
valleys of the credit cycle;
* Regulators should enhance guidance related to pipeline risk man-
agement for firms that use an originate-to-distribute model;
* The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) should
promptly complete the work it has initiated to update the Com-
mittee's 2000 guidance on liquidity management, including the
sound practice guidelines to be followed by regulated financial
institutions as well as the oversight principles for supervisors.
* The BCBS and IOSCO should review capital requirements for
ABS CDOs and other re-securitizations and for off-balance sheet
commitments, with a view toward increasing requirements on ex-
posures that have been the source of recent losses to firms;
* Regulators should require financial institutions to make more de-
tailed and comprehensive disclosures of off-balance sheet com-
mitments, including commitments to support ABCP conduits and
other off-balance sheet vehicles;
" Regulators should encourage financial institutions to improve the
quality of disclosures about fair value estimates for complex and
other illiquidinstruments, including descriptions of valuation
methodologies and information regarding the degree of uncer-
tainty associated with such estimates;
* Regulators should review the current use of ratings in regulation
and supervisory rules. At a minimum, regulators should distin-
guish, as appropriate, between ratings of structured credit prod-
ucts and ratings of corporate and municipal bonds in regulatory
and supervisory policies; and
* Authorities should encourage FASB to evaluate the role of ac-
counting standards in the current market turmoil. This evalua-
tion should include an assessment of the need for further
modifications to accounting standards related to consolidation
and securitization, with the goal of improving transparency and
the operation of U.S. standards in the short-term. Additionally,
authorities should encourage FASB and IASB to achieve more
rapid convergence of accounting standards for consolidation of
ABCP conduits and other off-balance sheet vehicles.
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Additionally, while the infrastructure of the financial markets thus far
has coped quite well with heightened price volatility and surging trading
volumes, the PWG believes that the supervisors of OTC derivatives deal-
ers, who have been working together under the leadership of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, should insist on further enhancements to the
infrastructure for the rapidly growing OTC derivatives markets.
Recommendations to enhance the OTC derivative market infrastructure
include:
* Supervisors should insist that the industry promptly set ambitious
standards for the accuracy and timeliness of trade data submis-
sion and the timeliness of resolutions of trade matching errors for
OTC derivatives;
* Supervisors should urge the industry to amend standard credit
derivative trade documentation to provide for cash settlement of
obligations stemming from a credit event in accordance with the
terms of the cash settlement protocol that has been developed
but not yet incorporated into standard documentation; and
* Supervisors should ask the industry to develop a longer-term plan
for an integrated operational infrastructure supporting OTC de-
rivatives that:
" captures all significant processing events over the entire life-
cycle of trades;
" delivers operational reliability and scalability;
o maximizes the efficiencies obtainable from automation and
electronic processing platforms by promoting standardization
and interoperability of infrastructure components;
" enhances participants' ability to manage counterparty risk
through netting and collateral agreements by promoting port-
folio reconciliation and accurate valuation of trades;
" addresses all major asset classes and product types; and
" encompasses the buy side as well as the dealer community.
II. Comprehensive Review of Contributing Factors
1. Underwriting standards for U.S. adjustable-rate subprime mortgages
weakened dramatically between late 2004 and early 2007. As housing
prices subsequently softened, the delinquency rate for such mortgages
soared, exceeding 20 percent of the entire outstanding stock of adjusta-
ble-rate subprime mortgages in late 2007.2
2. Nearly all of these mortgages were packaged in residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) and a large share of the subprime RMBS were
purchased by managers of CDOs of asset-backed securities (ABS), so-
called ABS CDOs. The subprime RMBS and the ABS CDOs were struc-
tured in tranches and a very large share of the total value of the securities
issued was rated AA or AAA by the credit rating agencies.
2. By contrast, the delinquency rate on the stock of outstanding fixed-rate subprime
mortgages increased by only three percentage points over the same period, to
around 8 percent.
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3. Both U.S. and international investors were eager purchasers of these
securities. Indeed, the loosening of credit standards and terms in the sub-
prime market was symptomatic of a broader erosion of market discipline
on the standards and terms of loans to households and businesses. Fol-
lowing many years of benign economic and financial conditions, global
investors had become quite complacent about risks, even in the case of
new and increasingly complex financial instruments.
4. Many of the global investors in the AA and AAA tranches relied
heavily on the ratings in making investment decisions or in communicat-
ing risk appetites to their investment managers, rather than undertaking
their own independent credit analysis on instruments that often were
quite complex. When it became apparent that even AAA tranches of
some ABS CDOs could face large writedowns, investors lost faith in the
ratings of complex structured products more broadly.
5. No longer willing to rely on ratings and unable to perform their own
credit analyses, investors pulled back from a wide range of structured
product markets. Issuance of all types of non-agency RMBS declined
substantially. In addition, issuance of collateralized loan obligations
(CLOs) became more difficult, at a time when a huge overhang of lever-
aged loan commitments ($225 billion in the U.S. alone) had already made
investors reluctant to buy such loans at committed spreads and terms.
6. From 2004 to 2007, ABCP markets in the U.S. and abroad had grown
very rapidly. Much of the growth was accounted for by conduits, includ-
ing structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and CDOs, which purchased
securities, including non-agency RMBS and CDOs, rather than by more
traditional conduits that purchased short-term corporate and consumer
receivables. As in the case of structured finance products, investors in
ABCP, including money market funds, seem to have relied heavily on
credit ratings rather than making their own assessments of the structure
of these programs and the underlying collateral. As investors became
aware that some of the underlying collateral was RMBS and CDOs, they
pulled back from the ABCP market generally, and even, to some extent,
from more traditional programs. In the United States alone, ABCP out-
standing declined by about one-third, or $370 billion, between early Au-
gust 2007 and late December 2007. Since that time the amount of U.S.
ABCP outstanding has changed little on balance.
7. The seizing up of structured credit markets and the contraction of
ABCP markets imposed significant liquidity pressures on many of the
largest U.S. and European financial institutions. These firms were the
leading underwriters of non-agency RMBS and of ABS CDOs. When the
structured credit markets shut down, the firms were left holding mort-
gages and RMBS that could not be sold off. Firms also were left holding
exposures to leveraged loans that were in the process of being syndicated.
Still more exposures were created when, in order to protect their reputa-
tions, some firms elected to purchase assets from, or extend credit to, off-
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balance sheet vehicles that they had organized and money market and
other investment funds that they managed.
8. Many of these same firms were revealed to have concentrated expo-
sures to subprime credit risk. While the business model of these firms
with respect to subprime mortgages had been described as "originate to
distribute," it gradually became apparent that some had retained signifi-
cant credit exposures to the subprime market by retaining super-senior
CDO tranches and by providing credit and liquidity enhancements to
ABCP programs that invested in super-senior tranches of RMBS and
CDOs. As a result, some firms suffered significant losses.
9. Firms themselves struggled to determine the size of these exposures
and the resulting losses. As the structured credit markets seized up, relia-
ble market-based price discovery became much more difficult for an in-
creasing share of firms' portfolios; in many cases, models that were used
for valuation in the absence of reliable market prices had not been ade-
quately developed, or were not appropriate for the complex securities
being evaluated. In addition, some firms had difficulty identifying and
aggregating their exposures to subprime mortgage assets. As a result,
they became concerned about the adequacy of their capital and the size
of their balance sheets. They also became less confident of their assess-
ments of the credit risk of other market participants that were known or
suspected of holding such securities. In addition to concerns about
counterparties' valuation practices, information about their holdings of
such securities generally was not publicly available.
10. The combination of liquidity and balance sheet pressures and
heightened credit concerns made banks reluctant to provide others with
term funding. Term premiums embodied in LIBOR rates increased, at
times to more than 100 basis points, and some other types of term fund-
ing became more difficult and costly. Traditional central bank liquidity
tools were unable to bring term premiums in the interbank markets
down. Changes to the primary credit program that the Federal Reserve
announced in August 2007 - the narrowing of the spread of the primary
credit rate relative to the target funds rate and increased scope to borrow
at term - had little success, perhaps because they did not eliminate the
stigma associated with borrowing from the central bank. Moreover, dis-
count window facilities likely do not substantially reduce banks' concerns
about balance sheet pressures or counterparty risk. With creditors skittish
and banks' balance sheets increasing, conditions in term funding markets
remained strained through year-end 2007.
11. More generally, uncertainty about asset valuations in illiquid mar-
kets and about financial institutions' exposures to asset price changes left
investors and markets jittery. Of particular concern were the exposures
of financial guarantors to protection they had provided on super-senior
CDO tranches. Downgrades of these institutions' credit ratings could dis-
rupt financial markets in which investors rely heavily on their guarantees,
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notably the U.S. municipal bond market. In addition, failure of one of
the guarantors would impose additional losses on financial institutions
that had purchased CDO protection from the guarantor.
12. Prior to year-end 2007, a new tool, the Term Auction Facility (TAF),
was deployed by the Federal Reserve. It appears not to have been hin-
dered by concerns about stigma and appears to have helped reduce term
premiums. However, it is uncertain how much of the reduction in term
premiums just after year-end 2007 resulted from the availability of the
TAF and how much was the result of relieved concern following year-
end.
13. By early 2008, the financial disorder had not abated. Issuance of
RMBS remained very weak, issuance of commercial mortgage-backed se-
curities (CMBS) was off substantially from the first half of 2007, and
CLO issuance was running well below its levels of spring 2007. Term pre-
miums declined with the turn of the year but subsequently have widened,
reportedly on renewed concerns about bank balance sheet pressures and
heightened uncertainty about the economic outlook. More recently, li-
quidity in the agency RMBS market has deteriorated, yields on municipal
bonds have risen substantially relative to those on comparable-maturity
Treasuries, and issuance of municipal bonds has declined noticeably.
Costs of residential mortgage and business credit were up significantly
compared to the summer of 2007, and survey evidence pointed to tighter
standards for a broad range of loans. In part, the higher costs and tighter
standards appeared to reflect concerns about the effects of the contrac-
tion in the housing sector and the developments in financial markets on
the broader economy.
14. Losses from hedge fund defaults through year-end 2007 were negli-
gible, but preliminary data indicate that hedge fund performance was
poor in January, and in the last few weeks, a growing number of hedge
funds have missed margin calls. Counterparties continue to monitor their
exposures to hedge funds closely.
15. The infrastructure of the financial markets generally has coped quite
well with the heightened price volatility and surging trading volumes.
Backlogs of unconfirmed trades in credit derivatives increased substan-
tially in July and August 2007 but subsequently receded. Although li-
quidity in the credit derivatives markets has declined noticeably by some
measures, those markets have continued to perform important price dis-
covery and risk management functions.
III. Policy Issues and Recommendations
A. Reforming the Mortgage Origination Process
Issues
1. State-licensed mortgage brokers, who take loan applications and
shop them to depository institutions or other lenders, had similarly weak
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incentives. Weak government oversight of these entities also contributed
to the rise in unsound underwriting practices.
2. Originators had weak incentives to maintain strong underwriting
standards, particularly at a time when securitizers, credit rating agencies,
and mortgage investors did not conduct due diligence sufficient to align
originator incentives with the underlying risks. Against this backdrop,
limited government oversight of mortgage companies not affiliated with
regulated depositories, which made about half of higher-priced mortgages
in 2006, contributed to a rise in unsound underwriting practices in the
subprime sector, including, in some cases, fraudulent and abusive
practices.
3. Consumer protection rules and disclosure requirements did not suffi-
ciently protect consumers against improper lending.
Recommendations to address issues
1. State financial regulators should implement strong nationwide licens-
ing standards for mortgage brokers. As a first step, the CSBS and the
American Association of Residential Mortgage Regulators (AARMR)
have already created a nationwide licensing system and database for
mortgage professionals; seven states began participating when the system
was initially started, and dozens more committed to participate over time.
2. Federal and state regulators should strengthen and make consistent
government oversight of all entities that originate and fund mortgages
and otherwise interface with customers in the mortgage origination pro-
cess. All states should work towards adopting the principles set forth in
the guidance developed by the federal regulators for nontraditional and
subprime mortgage lending and ensure that effective enforcement mech-
anisms are in place to deal with noncompliance with such standards. One
key step that already has been taken is that the Conference of State Bank
Supervisors (CSBS) issued principles-based underwriting guidance on
subprime mortgages in July 2007 that was nearly identical to guidance
issued earlier by federal supervisory agencies. In addition, a group of su-
pervisors has launched a pilot program to review the underwriting stan-
dards and senior management oversight of risk management strategies
for ensuring compliance with consumer protection laws and regulations at
selected nondepository lenders with significant subprime mortgage oper-
ations.3 The results of these reviews should be analyzed in order to deter-
mine whether to continue the project and, if so, how to focus future
reviews.
3. The Federal Reserve should issue stronger consumer protection rules
and mandate enhanced consumer protection disclosures that would make
affordability over the life of the mortgage more transparent and that
3. The Federal Reserve, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, the CSBS, and the American Association of Residential Mortgage Regula-
tors (AARMR) are participating in the pilot program.
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would facilitate comparison of the terms with those of alternative prod-
ucts. To this end, the Federal Reserve is currently engaged in a review of
the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) rules for mortgage loans, including con-
sumer testing, and plans to propose new mortgage disclosures based on
the results. The Federal Reserve has already proposed changes to the
TILA rules to address concerns about incomplete or misleading mortgage
loan advertisements and solicitations and to require lenders to provide
mortgage disclosures more quickly. Those changes should be enacted
once appropriate account has been taken of feedback received over the
90-day comment period. In December 2007, the Federal Reserve used its
authority under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
(HOEPA) to propose new rules that address abuses related to prepay-
ment penalties, failure to escrow for taxes and insurance, stated-income
and low-documentation lending, and failure to give adequate considera-
tion to borrowers' ability to repay. These rules should be enacted once
appropriate account has been taken of feedback received over the 90-day
comment period.
4. State and federal authorities should coordinate to enforce consumer
protection and disclosure rules evenly across all types of mortgage
originators.
5. Federal and state authorities should pursue mortgage market partici-
pants who engaged in fraudulent transactions and any parties undertak-
ing fraudulent schemes to take advantage of households facing
foreclosure.
B. Improving Investors' Contributions to Market Discipline
Issues
1. Investors and asset managers failed to obtain sufficient information
or to conduct comprehensive risk assessments. For many investors, the
use of credit ratings in risk management systems has fallen behind inno-
vation in financial markets. In particular, many investors seem to treat a
credit rating as a "sufficient statistic" for the full range of risks associated
with an instrument, when, in fact, credit ratings are assessments of
creditworthiness, and not of liquidity, market, or other risks. Some inves-
tors also relied exclusively on ratings for valuation purposes.
2. In turn, originators, underwriters, and sponsors did not always supply
investors with sufficient information related to assets they were selling,
securitizing, or using as collateral for structured credit products.
3. Separately, firms that sponsor ABCP programs or provide liquidity
or credit enhancements to such programs disclose to their own sharehold-
ers and creditors considerably less information about the nature and com-
position of risk characteristics of the underlying assets than they would if
the assets were on their own balance sheets.
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4. Although market participants had economic incentives to conduct
due diligence and evaluate risk-adjusted returns, the steps they took were
insufficient, resulting in a significant erosion of market discipline
Recommendations to address issues
1. Overseers of institutional investors (for example, the Department of
Labor for private pension funds; state treasurers for public pension funds;
and the SEC for money market funds) should require investors (and their
asset managers) to obtain from sponsors and underwriters of securitized
credits access to better information about the risk characteristics of such
credits, including information about the underlying asset pools, on an ini-
tial and ongoing basis.
2. Overseers should ensure that these investors (and their asset manag-
ers) develop an independent view of the risk characteristics of the instru-
ments in their portfolios, rather than rely solely on credit ratings.
3. To limit rating shopping, underwriters and sponsors of structured fi-
nance products should publicly disclose whether, after submitting final
data and information about a proposed structure to one or more CRAs
and receiving preliminary ratings from the CRA(s) based on the informa-
tion, they choose to publish some but not all of the preliminary rating(s)
as final ratings. The disclosure should include the reason for not having
any such preliminary ratings published as final ratings.
4. To enable investors to improve their due diligence for structured fi-
nance products, underwriters and sponsors should provide improved dis-
closures for RMBS, ABS CDOs, and other structured products. Asset
managers and financial institutions, including those running conduits,
should provide improved disclosures.
5. Investors should take account of differences in risk between different
classes of instruments, rather than relying on generic credit ratings when
making investment decisions, communicating investment mandates to in-
vestment managers, and evaluating investment managers.
6. Where investors utilize investment consultants, they should insist that
the consultants develop an independent view of the broad range of risk
characteristics of the types of instruments in the investor's portfolio,
rather than solely relying on the credit ratings.
7. Building on its existing templates for disclosures by multi-seller
ABCP conduits, the American Securitization Forum (ASF) should de-
velop templates for disclosures to investors for other types of securitiza-
tions. Supervisors should encourage banks and other regulated entities
that sponsor ABCP conduits to make disclosures consistent with the
templates.
8. The PWG will engage the private sector to create a committee to
develop best practices regarding disclosure to investors in securitized
credits, including ABS and CDOs of ABS.
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9. Consistent with their disclosures of on-balance sheet risk, public com-
panies that sponsor or provide credit or liquidity enhancements to ABCP
programs should disclose the distribution of assets underlying the pro-
grams by type, industry, and credit risk to the extent material to the
company.
C. Reforming the Ratings Agencies' Process for and Practices
regarding Structured Credit and Other Securitized Credit Products
Issues
1. Credit rating agencies contributed significantly to the recent market
turmoil by underestimating the credit risk of subprime RMBS and other
structured credit products, notably ABS CDOs.
2. With respect to subprime RMBS, in part the rating agencies underes-
timated the credit risk because they underestimated the severity and
breadth of the softening in housing prices and the potential for fraud.
3. The rating agencies' models for rating ABS CDOs relied on assump-
tions about correlations between ABS that underestimated the degree of
linkages between underlying securities.
4. As acknowledged by the rating agencies, structured products have
quite different risk characteristics from corporate bonds. Nonetheless,
they used the same rating categories for both types of instruments and
many investors seem to have acted as if they did not understand or appre-
ciate that the risk characteristics differed.
5. The methodologies that the rating agencies used to rate structured
products are reasonably transparent. Nonetheless, greater transparency
is both possible and desirable.
Recommendations to address issues
1. Credit rating agencies should disclose what qualitative reviews they
perform on originators of assets that collateralize ABS rated by the CRA
and should require underwriters of ABS to represent the level and scope
of due diligence performed on the underlying assets.
2. The CRAs should reform their ratings processes for structured credit
products to ensure integrity and transparency. The PWG welcomes the
steps already taken by the CRAs, and particularly encourages the CRAs
to: (a) enforce policies and procedures that manage conflicts of interest,
including implementing changes suggested by the SEC's broad review of
conflict of interest issues; (b) publish sufficient information about the as-
sumptions underlying their credit rating methodologies and models, so
that users of credit ratings can understand how a particular credit rating
was determined; (c) make changes to the credit rating process that would
clearly differentiate ratings for structured products from ratings for cor-
porate and municipal securities; (d) make ratings performance measures
for structured credit products and other ABS readily available to the pub-
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lic in a manner that facilitates comparison across products and credit rat-
ings; (e) work with investors to provide the information investors need to
make informed decisions about risk, including measures of the uncer-
tainty associated with ratings and of potential ratings volatility; and (f)
ensure that adequate personnel and financial resources are allocated to
monitoring and updating its ratings.
3. The rating agencies should be encouraged to conduct formal, peri-
odic, internal reviews of criteria and methodologies for ratings of struc-
tured credit products.
4. The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
should be encouraged to continue addressing credit rating issues through
revisions to its "Code of Conduct."
5. The PWG will facilitate formation of a private-sector group (with
representatives of investors, issuers, underwriters, and CRAs) to develop
recommendations for further steps that the issuers, underwriters, CRAs,
and policy makers could take to ensure the integrity and transparency of
ratings, and to foster appropriate use of ratings in risk assessment.
6. The PWG member agencies will reinforce steps taken by the CRAs
through revisions to supervisory policy and regulation, including regula-
tory capital requirements that use ratings.
7. The PWG will revisit the need for changes to CRA oversight if the
reforms adopted by the CRAs are not sufficient to ensure the integrity
and transparency of ratings.
D. Strengthening Global Financial Institutions' Risk Management
Practices
Issues
1. The effectiveness of certain risk management practices was a key fac-
tor that differentiated institutions that sustained significant losses during
the financial crisis from institutions that, while affected to some degree,
avoided significant losses.
2. Firms that suffered significant losses tended to exhibit the following
risk management weaknesses: (a) weak controls over potential balance
sheet growth, including ineffective limits on the growth of business lines
and poor monitoring of off-balance sheet exposures; (b) inadequate com-
munications among senior management, business lines, and risk manage-
ment functions; (c) dependence on a narrow range of risk measures that
were based on assumptions that proved erroneous and on measurement
processes that were difficult to alter once it became apparent that the
underlying assumptions were wrong; and (d) insufficient attention to val-
uation issues, including excessive reliance on credit ratings and inade-
quate development of models for valuing complex or potentially illiquid
securities.
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3. These weaknesses were particularly evident with respect to the man-
agement of certain business lines: (a) CDO warehouses; (b) syndication
of leveraged loans; and (c) conduit businesses (sponsorship or liquidity
support for SIVs and other conduits that issued ABCP).
4. The root causes of valuation uncertainty were the failure of many
financial institutions to develop sufficiently robust valuation models for
complex, mortgage-related structured products and fundamental uncer-
tainty about the ultimate performance of the underlying mortgage pools.
5. Losses from hedge fund defaults through year-end 2007 were negligi-
ble, but preliminary data indicate that hedge fund performance was poor
in January, and in the last few weeks, a growing number of hedge funds
have missed margin calls. Counterparties continue to monitor their expo-
sures to hedge funds closely. Prior to the financial crisis, a multilateral
review of major banks' and securities firms' counterparty risk manage-
ment practices revealed some weaknesses with respect to the measure-
ment of potential exposures and stress tests. In recent meetings with
supervisors, financial institutions noted that some of those weaknesses
remained.
Recommendations to address issues
1. Global financial institutions should promptly identify and address any
weaknesses in risk management practices that the turmoil has revealed.
These firms, and other financial institutions with similar types of weak-
nesses in their operations, should strongly reemphasize the importance
of: (a) a strong, independent risk management function; (b) strategic
planning with respect to balance sheet growth and utilization of capital
and liquidity; (c) assessment of risks on an integrated basis across the
enterprise; (d) ongoing communication among senior management, busi-
ness lines, and risk management functions; and (e) the development of,
and adherence to, strong operational and financial reporting controls
over valuations.
2. The PWG will support formation of a private-sector group to reassess
implementation of the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group II's
(CRMPG II) existing guiding principles and recommendations regarding
risk management, risk monitoring, and transparency, and to modify or
develop new principles and recommendations as necessary to incorporate
lessons from the recent turmoil, including lessons regarding valuation
practices.
3. Supervisors of global financial institutions should closely monitor the
firms' efforts to address risk management weaknesses, taking action if
necessary to ensure that weaknesses are addressed.
4. U.S. banking regulators and the SEC should promptly assess current
guidance and develop common guidance to address the risk management
weaknesses revealed by the recent market turmoil, including improve-
ments to: (a) management information systems, including procedures that
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ensure aggregation of exposures across all business lines and ensure rig-
orous valuations of instruments and exposures; (b) concentration risk
management, liquidity risk management, stress testing, and other risk
management practices that are necessary to ensure that liquidity and cap-
ital cushions are sufficiently robust to absorb extreme system-wide
shocks; and (c) governance of the risk management and control frame-
work, including practices that address incentive problems in compensa-
tion policies.
5. U.S. authorities should encourage other supervisors of global firms to
make complementary efforts to develop guidance along the same lines.
E. Enhancing Prudential Regulatory Policies
Issues
1. Various regulatory policies failed to mitigate some of the risk man-
agement weaknesses that have been identified.
2. Minimization of regulatory capital requirements by banks is an im-
portant driver of bank behavior. The limited risk sensitivity of Basel I
encouraged banks to securitize low-risk assets and to support securitiza-
tions through facilities having low mandated capital charges. The securi-
tization framework in Basel II is a more risk-sensitive approach that
addresses many (but not all) of Basel I's shortcomings in that area. Ex-
isting capital requirements are not designed to address non-contractual
exposures such as those arising from sponsorship of SIVs or mutual funds
that firms may assume for reputational reasons.
3. Once firms experienced losses, their desire to maintain a capital
buffer above regulatory levels significantly increased the risk that they
would restrict credit availability and thereby add to stress in credit mar-
kets, with the potential for feedback on the real economy.
4. Authorities did not insist on appropriate reporting and disclosures of
off-balance sheet vehicles.
Recommendations to address issues
1. Regulators should adopt policies that provide incentives for financial
institutions to hold capital and liquidity cushions commensurate with
firm-wide exposure (both on- and off-balance sheet) to severe adverse
market events. These cushions should be forward looking and adjust ap-
propriately through peaks and valleys of the credit cycle.
2. Regulators should enhance guidance related to pipeline risk manage-
ment for firms that use an originate-to-distribute model.
3. Given the weak controls over balance sheet growth at some firms and
the resulting liquidity pressures that those firms experienced, the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) should promptly complete
its work to update the Committee's 2000 guidance on liquidity manage-
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ment, including the sound practice guidelines to be followed by regulated
financial institutions as well as the oversight principles for supervisors.
4. The BCBS and IOSCO should review capital requirements for ABS
CDOs and other resecuritizations and for off-balance sheet commit-
ments, with a view toward increasing requirements on exposures that
have been the source of recent losses to firms. In particular, they should
reconsider the relationship between external credit ratings and capital
charges under the "ratings based approach," especially for ABS CDOs
and other securitizations of ABS, as well as the relationship between ex-
ternal ratings and capital charges under the "internal assessment ap-
proach" for exposures to ABCP programs. 4
5. Supervisors should review the adequacy of guidance on Basel II's Pil-
lar 2 with respect to the consideration of the reputational risks that con-
duit and asset management businesses entail and the implications for
institutions' need for economic capital and their liquidity contingency
plans.
6. To promote the maintenance of strong capital cushions and to miti-
gate the possibility that a more risk-based capital regime will heighten the
potential for capital requirements to amplify credit and economic cycles,
supervisors should rigorously assess banks' implementation of the Ad-
vanced Internal Ratings Based Approach to Basel II, especially the con-
servatism of estimates of losses from defaults during a downturn and the
robustness of banks' stress tests.
7. Regulators should require financial institutions to improve their in-
ternal reporting and make more detailed and comprehensive disclosures
of off-balance sheet commitments, including commitments to support
ABCP conduits and other off-balance sheet vehicles.
8. Regulators should encourage financial institutions to improve the
quality of disclosures about fair value estimates for complex and other
illiquid instruments, including descriptions of valuation methodologies
and information regarding the degree of uncertainty associated with such
estimates.
9. State insurance commissioners should review the appropriateness of
capital requirements for financial guarantors in light of changes in the
firms' business lines. Financial guarantors should strengthen their models
for assessing the risks of new activities.
10. Regulators should review the current use of ratings in regulatory
and supervisory rules. At a minimum, regulators should distinguish, as
appropriate, between ratings of structured credit products and ratings of
corporate and municipal bonds in regulatory and supervisory policies.
4. In the internal assessment approach the bank assigns an internal rating to the ex-
posure and then maps the rating to an equivalent external rating.
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11. Authorities should encourage FASB to evaluate the role of account-
ing standards in the current market turmoil. This evaluation should in-
clude an assessment of the need for further modifications to accounting
standards related to consolidation and securitization, with the goal of im-
proving transparency and the operation of U.S. standards in the short-
term. Additionally, authorities should encourage FASB and IASB to
achieve more rapid convergence of accounting standards for consolida-
tion of ABCP conduits and other off-balance sheet vehicles.
F. Enhancements to the Infrastructure for OTC Derivatives Markets
Issues
1. While the infrastructure of the financial markets generally has coped
quite well with heightened price volatility and surging trading volumes,
there have been issues with the accuracy and timeliness of trade data sub-
mission; the timeliness of resolutions of trade matching errors; documen-
tation and cash settlement; electronic post-trade processing; backlogs;
integrated processing, and reconciliation and valuation.
2. Although the industry has made significant progress in automating
the infrastructure of the OTC derivatives markets over the last two years,
the industry has not achieved a "steady state" in which events do not
increase operational problems. This was evident in July and August 2007
when a spike in credit derivatives trades resulted in substantial increases
in backlogs of unconfirmed trades throughout the industry.
3. Although the industry has developed a "cash settlement protocol"
that can obviate the need for purchasers of credit protection to physically
deliver obligations of the reference entity following a default or other
credit event, standard industry trade documentation still requires physical
settlement. Until the protocol is incorporated into standard industry doc-
umentation, there is a risk of significant market disruption if one or more
major market participants chose not to adopt the protocol following a
credit event. Of particular concern is the market impact such choices
could have if multiple credit events were to occur simultaneously.
Recommendations to address issues
1. Supervisors should insist that the industry promptly set ambitious
standards for the accuracy and timeliness of trade data submission and
the timeliness of resolutions of trade matching errors for OTC
derivatives.
2. Supervisors should urge the industry to promptly amend standard
credit derivative trade documentation to provide for cash settlement of
obligations stemming from a credit event, in accordance with the terms of
the cash settlement protocol that has been developed but not yet incorpo-
rated into standard documentation.
3. Supervisors should ask the industry to develop a longer-term plan for
an integrated operational infrastructure supporting OTC derivatives that:
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(a) captures all significant processing events over the entire lifecycle of
trades; (b) delivers operational reliability and scalability; (c) maximizes
the efficiencies obtainable from automation and electronic processing
platforms by promoting standardization and interoperability of infra-
structure components; (d) enhances participants' ability to manage
counterparty risk through netting and collateral agreements by promot-
ing portfolio reconciliation and accurate valuation of trades; (e) addresses
all major asset classes and products types; and (f) encompasses the buy
side as well as the dealer community.
Conclusion
Market participants have begun taking steps to address many of the
weaknesses that have contributed to the turmoil in global financial mar-
kets. Nonetheless, policy makers need to monitor their efforts closely
and reinforce them where necessary. In most cases policy makers' efforts
to promote implementation of these recommendations will require do-
mestic or international regulatory cooperation. The PWG will work to
ensure that U.S. federal regulators cooperate effectively with each other
and with the relevant state authorities. Internationally, the PWG is work-
ing with foreign regulators, finance ministries, and central banks through
the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) on a report to the G-7 Finance Minis-
ters and Governors that will provide a diagnosis of the causes of global
financial turmoil and an agreed-upon set of recommendations for ad-
dressing identified weaknesses in global markets and institutions. As part
of that cooperative process, the PWG has shared with the FSF the diag-
nosis and recommendations set out in this statement.
The PWG plans to issue a follow-up statement in the fourth quarter of
2008 that will assess progress toward implementation of its recommenda-
tions and the FSF's recommendations and consider whether further steps
are needed to address weaknesses in financial markets and institutions
and related regulatory policies.
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